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Abstract 32 
 Learned value is known to bias visual search towards valued stimuli. However, some 33 
uncertainty exists regarding the stage of visual processing that is modulated by learned value. 34 
Here, we directly tested the effect of learned value on pre-attentive processing using temporal 35 
order judgments. Across four experiments, we imbued some stimuli with high value and some 36 
with low value using a non-monetary reward task. In Experiment 1, we replicated the value-37 
driven distraction effect, validating our non-monetary reward task. Experiment 2 showed that 38 
high-value stimuli, but not low-value stimuli, exhibit a prior entry effect. Experiment 3, which 39 
reversed the temporal order judgment task (i.e., reporting which stimulus came second) showed 40 
no priority entry effect, indicating that while a response bias may be present for high-value 41 
stimuli, they are still reported as appearing earlier. However, Experiment 4, using a simultaneity 42 
judgment task, showed no shift in temporal perception. Overall, our results support the 43 
conclusion that learned value biases perceptual decisions about valued stimuli without speeding 44 
pre-attentive stimulus processing.  45 
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At any given moment, we can only attend to a small subset of the total amount of 46 
information in the visual environment. During each moment, there are a number of cognitive 47 
processes that collectively determine what information will be attended and what information 48 
will fall out of further processing.  For the most part, different states of attention have been 49 
considered to be due to either bottom-up processes – driven by causes external to the individual – 50 
or top-down processes – driven by the goals of the observer. However, recent research has 51 
highlighted the contribution of sources of selection that are internal to the observer, yet not 52 
determined by his or her current goals (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). The learned value 53 
of stimuli is one such source of attentional bias (e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a). 54 
These value-driven attention biases can occur even when the value-laden features of stimuli are 55 
task-irrelevant (e,g., Anderson et al., 2011a; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009). Although reliably 56 
observed in laboratory experiments, the particular stage, or stages, of perceptual processing 57 
affected by learned value is not yet understood. In this paper, we assess the ability of learned 58 
value to affect visual priority in a task that does not require selective processing. First, however, 59 
we review what is known about the ways that learned value bias perceptual processing. 60 
To study the effect of learned value on visual selection, studies have employed a two-61 
phase structure, wherein different stimuli are repeatedly paired with different amounts of reward 62 
in a learning phase, and then attentional biases to these stimuli are compared in a test phase in 63 
which the reward contingency is removed (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Anderson, Laurent, & 64 
Yantis, 2011a; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011b; Anderson, 2014; Miranda & Palmer, 2014; 65 
Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2014; MacLean & Giesbrecht, 2015). For example, Anderson, 66 
Laurent, and Yantis (2011b) trained participants to search for oriented bars within green or red 67 
circles amongst other colored distractor circles. For each participant, one target color had a high 68 
probability of producing a high reward, and the other target color had a high probability of 69 
producing a low reward.  After practicing this task, reward contingencies were removed, and 70 
participants instead searched for an oriented bar within a unique, diamond shape among 71 
distractor circles (similar to the added singleton paradigm pioneered by Theeuwes, 1992). 72 
Critically, one of these circles on each trial would be colored in either red or green, and both of 73 
these singleton distractors led to slowed search times. Importantly, singletons in the color that 74 
had received high reward in the learning phase produced greater interference, indicating that the 75 
learned value of stimuli produces an attentional bias over and above that of perceptual salience. 76 
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As recently noted by Müller, Rothermund, and Wentura (2015), the majority of studies 77 
on reward and attention rely on search tasks to assess the prioritization of rewarded stimuli, and 78 
it is therefore unclear which stages of visual processing are affected by reward. These authors 79 
argued that reward effects in search may be due to delayed disengagement, as opposed to a 80 
preattentive boost for visual features with learned value. To support this argument, the authors 81 
reported data from a modified dot-probe task. After imbuing visual objects with value in a 82 
speeded-discrimination task, previously rewarded objects’ ability to orient attention when acting 83 
as exogenous cues was compared neutral objects, as well as to objects associated with losses. 84 
While rewarded objects led to a larger cue validity effect, comparison with neutral cues showed 85 
that the rewarded objects led to slower disengagement (i.e., a larger difference between neutral 86 
and invalidly cued response times) but not to speeded orienting (i.e., no difference between 87 
neutral and validly cues response times). Müller et al. argued that delayed disengagement from 88 
rewarded stimuli could explain the attentional biases measured in search tasks, which are 89 
assessed by a slowed response time when an object with learned value appears as a distractor.   90 
Using a different paradigm, Hickey, Chelazzi, and Theeuwes (2011) have argued instead 91 
that reward is able to affect early stages of target detection and localization, and that this target 92 
enhancement mechanism is distinct from a distractor suppression mechanism that operates on a 93 
later stage of selection. Although this finding is based on results of tasks where the effect of 94 
rewards on inter-trial priming, and not learned value, is measured, their conclusion is consistent 95 
with a recent electrophysiological and behavioral study showing that reward history influences 96 
the early stages of visual attention selection by altering P1 amplitude (MacLean & Giesbrecht, 97 
2015, see Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010 for a similar result using immediate reward) and 98 
attentional capture, as indicated by the N2PC component (Qi, Zeng, Ding, & Li, 2013). Given 99 
that these studies involved associating learned values with stimuli, this result is inconsistent with 100 
Müller et al.’s conclusion that rewards solely affect delayed disengagement. Similarly, the 101 
suggestion that learned value solely delays disengagement is inconsistent with measures of 102 
oculomotor capture (Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Theeuwes & 103 
Belopolsky, 2012). Instead, it points to an effect of learned value that is pre-attentive, in the 104 
sense that it does not require first focusing attention on a particular object to be measured. 105 
Behavioral evidence of preattentive locus of reward comes from Kiss, Driver, and Eimer (2009) 106 
who showed that pop-out was enhanced for targets that often deliver higher rewards (see also 107 
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Lee & Shomstein, 2014), however Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, and Driver (2010) subsequently 108 
showed that this pop-out advantage rapidly reverses following a change in stimulus-reward 109 
contingencies, leaving uncertainty regarding whether learned value, as opposed to expected 110 
reward, operates at an early stage. What is missing is a direct, behavioral demonstration that 111 
stimuli with imbued learned value are prioritized for perception. 112 
Our goal in this study was to directly test the claim that learned value can enhance 113 
preattentive processing of visual information. To do so, we employed judgments of stimulus 114 
onset (temporal order judgments [TOJs] and simultaneity judgments [SJs]), which are used to 115 
measure visual prior entry. Prior entry refers to the accelerated conscious perception of some 116 
stimuli at the expense of others, leading to earlier conscious perception of these stimuli (Sharlau, 117 
2007; Spence & Parise, 2010). Prior entry is found to occur when attention is exogenously 118 
oriented to the location of an upcoming stimulus (Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; Hikosaka, 119 
Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001; Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; Born, 120 
Kerzel, & Pratt, 2015). Although ERPs measured alongside TOJs do not always demonstrate 121 
accelerated processing (i.e., reduced peak latency of early components of the visual evoked 122 
potential), increases in the amplitude of early components (e.g., P1, N1, P2) are reliably 123 
observed, indicating that behavioral prior entry effects correspond to changes in early visual 124 
processing (McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Di Russo, & Hillyard, 2005; Vibell, Klinge, Zampini, 125 
Spence, & Nobre, 2007). Importantly, these tasks can be used as a “cueless” tasks that measure 126 
the attentional biases that are intrinsic to stimuli, such as the speeded processing found for low 127 
spatial frequency patches (West, Anderson, Bedwell, & Pratt, 2010), emotional faces (West, 128 
Anderson, Pratt, 2009; West et al., 2010) and near surfaces (West, Pratt, & Peterson, 2013). 129 
Furthermore, they does not require selective processing – in fact, both stimuli must be registered 130 
to make a response – and so provides an index of visual priority when all information is equally 131 
relevant. Thus, TOJs and SJs provide an window into the perceptual biases that may exist for 132 
stimuli with learned value before focal attention is engaged, as it is difficult to envision a 133 
mechanism by which delayed disengagement alone could affect the relative perceived onset of 134 
stimuli.  135 
In the present study we used a learned value paradigm modeled after Anderson, Laurent 136 
and Yantis’ (2011b) study, with one major exception: instead of monetary value, we assigned 137 
value using a point system. For the Experiment 1, our goal was to replicate the results of the 138 
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Anderson et al (2011b) study, especially given that our point rewards did not map onto any 139 
monetary value. To do this, we followed their modified value-learning task with an additional 140 
singleton visual search task to establish that value training was successful. We show that when 141 
the additional singleton feature was associated with learned value; it slowed down visual search 142 
proportional to the size of its associated value. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same 143 
value-learning task as Experiment 1, but were then tested using a novel TOJ paradigm to assess 144 
whether learned value would modify visual priority. Experiments 3 and 4 measured the 145 
perception of temporal onset for rewarded stimuli using a reversed TOJ and a SJ task to 146 
distinguish between three accounts of changes in perceptual judgments: true prior entry, response 147 
biases, and decision biases. To preview our results, we observed that although learned value 148 
biases temporal onset responses, such that highly valued stimuli are reported to be perceived 149 
earlier, they do not bias perception when simultaneity, and not order, is measured. This supports 150 
the proposal that learned value has effects on visual processing beyond delayed disengagement; 151 
specifically, in biasing perceptual decisions. 152 
 153 
Experiment 1 154 
 As noted above, the main purpose of this experiment was to verify that rewarding 155 
participants with points rather than money would result in typical value-learning effects.   156 
Participants 157 
 Twenty-two undergraduate psychology students naïve to the experiment were recruited 158 
from University of Toronto. Each participant reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual 159 
acuity and color vision. Participants gave written informed consent for the experiment and were 160 
provided with a course credit for participating in the experiment. All experimental procedures 161 
were approved by University of Toronto’s Office of Research Ethics and were in accordance 162 
with the Declaration of Helsinki. 163 
Apparatus 164 
 The experiment was conducted using a Windows-run PC with a 19” CRT (1024 x 768 165 
resolution with 85 Hz refresh rate) in a quiet and dimly lit room. Participants sat and viewed the 166 
monitor from a distance of 50cm with their chin rested on the chin-rest throughout the 167 
experiment. The experiment was run in MATLAB, using Psychophysics toolbox.  Participants 168 
entered responses by using a standard keyboard. 169 
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Stimuli and Procedure 170 
 Participants were tested in a dimly lit room for a single 1-hour session. Prior to the 171 
experiment participants were presented with the instructions of the experiment using a 172 
PowerPoint presentation that included images of the visual stimuli used in the experiment 173 
alongside with the written instructions. Participants were told to place their chin on the chin-rest 174 
and to make fast and accurate responses on each trial of the experiment. 175 
 Each phase of the experiment began with a screen with instructions reiterating the 176 
instructions that had been orally provided to the participants.  Stimuli for both phases were 177 
presented against a uniform grey background with a white fixation cross, 0.4° in size, centered 178 
on the screen.  179 
Training phase 180 
 The training phase of Experiment 1 was used to imbue stimuli with learned value by 181 
repeatedly pairing them different rewards. Trials in the training phase were made up of displays 182 
composed of four Landolt-Cs, 1.5° in radius, drawn in four different colors, appearing at random 183 
positions, all centered 6.4° from fixation. Of these Landolt Cs, three, with their gaps (0.36° in 184 
size) on the top or bottom, were distractor stimuli, and one, with its gap on the right or left, was 185 
the target stimulus. The possible colors of each the distractor stimuli were orange (RGB: 192, 186 
192, 0), blue (RGB: 0, 192, 192), yellow (RGB: 255, 128, 0) and, depending on the trial, the 187 
target stimulus could be either red (RGB: 255, 0, 0) or green (RGB: 0, 255, 0). The search 188 
display was presented until participants made their response. Participants had to identify if the 189 
gap on the colored circle was left or right by pressing the left-arrow or right-arrow keys, 190 
respectively. A feedback display followed the response to inform the participant of how many 191 
points he or she had earned for the completed trial, which was presented in the center of the 192 
screen in white Arial font varying in size depending on the reward magnitude. High-reward (200 193 
points) were shown in large text (48 point, approximately 1.8° in height) while low-reward (20 194 
points) were shown in smaller text (16 point, approximately 0.6° in height). The total amount of 195 
points were presented for 1 second, and added to a running tally that was continuously visible at 196 
the top of the screen. 197 
 Correct responses were followed by visual feedback indicating amount of points earned 198 
during the training phase. High-reward targets were followed by 200 points (high reward) 199 
feedback on 80% of the trials and low-reward feedback on 20% of the trials. Low-reward targets 200 
LEARNED VALUE PRIOR ENTRY 8 
were followed by 20 points (low reward) feedback on 80% of the trials and high-reward 201 
feedback on 20% of the trials. High-reward target color and low-reward target color was 202 
randomly assigned as red or green for each participant.  203 
 The training phase consisted of a variable number of trials grouped into 12 blocks. Prior 204 
to completing the training phase, practice trials were provided. Practice trials were identical to 205 
actual trials except all visual stimuli were presented in white and points earned on each trial were 206 
equal to 0 or 10 points, for incorrect trials and correct trials, respectively. The practice phase 207 
ceased when participants had collected 100 points; in other words, once they had correctly 208 
completed 10 trials. Between each block and after completion of training phase, participants 209 
were provided with a short break. Each block was terminated after the participant had 210 
accumulated 2500 points. 211 
  Test phase 212 
For our test phase, we used an additional singleton task (Theeuwes, 1992). During this 213 
task, eight stimuli appeared on a search display, where each search stimulus was placed, evenly 214 
spaced, the circumference of an imaginary circle, radius 6.4°, centered on fixation. Seven of 215 
these stimuli were Landolt Cs, 1.5° in radius, and the eighth stimulus was a Landolt square 216 
outline, 3.0° in width and height, Each Landolt had a 0.36° gap on either the left or right side 217 
(forward facing or reverse). The target was defined as the square outline with a 0.36° gap on 218 
either the left or right side. Depending on the trial type, either all stimuli were colored in white, 219 
or all stimuli were colored in white except for one (the additional singleton), which was either 220 
drawn in the high-reward associated color or the low-reward associated. There were no feedback 221 
or points provided following each trial.   222 
 The search display was presented until participant made their response. Participant had to 223 
identify which side the gap, left or right, is located on the square target by pressing the z or m 224 
key, respectively. Response time was measured from the onset of the visual stimuli to the 225 
response made by each participant.  226 
 The test phase of the experiment included 320 trials that were divided into 8 blocks. Once 227 
again, practice trials were provided before the test phase was completed. In total there were four 228 
conditions in which RTs were compared for the addition singleton: no color, distractor color, 229 
high-value color and low-value color. High-value and low-value colors refer to the same colors 230 
used for the high-reward and low-reward target for the training phase of the experiment.  Target 231 
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and additional singletons were equally likely to appear in each of the eight positions of the search 232 
array throughout the experiment. The additional singleton always appeared as a distractor. The 233 
search display stayed on the screen until participant made their response and then the next search 234 
display will be presented.  235 
 236 
 237 
Figure 1. Upper panel: schematic of the training phase used in Experiments 1 and 2. Point-based 238 
rewards were delivered upon correct response input. Participants’ task was to report the gap 239 
location of the red or green Landolt. Lower panel: Schematic of test phases for Experiment 1 and 240 
Experiment 2. Lower left panels depict a high-value singleton trial and a no-singleton trial in 241 
Experiment 1. Lower right panels depict a high-value TOJ trial (top) and a low-value TOJ trial 242 
(bottom). Stimuli are not drawn to scale. 243 
 244 
Results and Discussion 245 
 Correct response times in the acquisition were analysed by dividing the training phase 246 
into first and last halves, each of which with high- and low-reward associated targets. Trials were 247 
trimmed within-participants by removing trials with RTs outside of 2 standard deviations of a 248 
participant’s mean RT. A Block x Reward ANOVA revealed a main effect of Block, F(1, 21) = 249 
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27.10, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.56, but no main effect of Reward, F(1, 21), = 0.84, p = .37, ηp2 = 0.04, 250 
and no interaction, F(1, 21) = 1.03, p = .32, ηp2 = 0.05, although response times were 251 
numerically faster for high-reward targets, M = 519, SE = 5ms, than low-reward targets, M = 252 
531ms, SE = 4ms, in the last half of the training phase. Thus, we did not find reliable evidence of 253 
a difference in response time between high- and low-reward targets in our training phase.  254 
 In the test phase, correct response times and accuracy were M = 535 ms, SE = 15 ms, and 255 
M = 97.2%, SE = 0.6%, respectively. To determine whether learned value from the training 256 
phase affected the allocation of attention in the test phase, average correct response times for the 257 
additional singleton effects in the test phase were analysed using a one-way, repeated measures 258 
ANOVA with Singleton Condition (Low Value, High Value, and no Singleton) as a factor. 259 
Averaged correct response times in each condition are shown in Figure 2. A main effect of 260 
singleton type was present, F(2, 42) = 8.80, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.30. Follow-up contrasts revealed 261 
that Low Value Singletons slowed search times relative to No Singleton trials, F(1, 21) = 4.82, p 262 
= .04, ηp2 = 0.19, and, critically, that High Value Singletons slowed search times even further, 263 
relative to Low Value Singletons, F(1, 21) = 6.15, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.23. No differences in accuracy 264 
were observed by Singleton Condition, F(2, 42) = 0.99, p = .38, ηp2 = 0.05. This demonstrates 265 
that, in a task that used points in lieu of monetary reward, learned value led to stable changes in 266 
attentional priority, such that stimuli associated with more reward exhibited increased distraction 267 
in a subsequent task. 268 
 269 
 270 
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Figure 2. Correct response times in the test phase of Experiment 1. Error bars represent 1 within-271 
subjects standard error. 272 
 273 
Experiment 2 274 
 Given that we were able to show a learned value effect on the allocation of attention in 275 
our version of the task used by Anderson et al. (2011b), we substituted a temporal order 276 
judgment task in to the test phase to measure whether learned value affects the speed with which 277 
stimuli are processed. If learned value does increase pre-attentive visual priority, we expected 278 
that stimuli associated with higher value should be perceived earlier than stimuli with lower 279 
value. 280 
Participants 281 
 Thirty-one undergraduate psychology students naïve to the experiment were recruited 282 
from the University of Toronto. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 283 
color vision. Participants were provided with a course credit in return for the participation of the 284 
experiment. None of the participants who participated in Experiment 1 were participants in 285 
Experiment 2. All experimental procedures were approved by University of Toronto’s Office of 286 
Research Ethics and in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 287 
Apparatus 288 
 The apparatus used were identical to Experiment 1 289 
Stimuli and Procedure 290 
 Similar to Experiment 1, instructions were presented orally using a PowerPoint 291 
presentation, which included written instructions along with all the visual stimuli included in the 292 
experiment.  All procedures used were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception of the test 293 
phase. The test phase began with a screen reiterating the instructions presented prior to the 294 
experiment. Participants were asked to identify which of the two filled circles they thought 295 
appeared first by pressing the z key if the left circle appeared first, or the m key if the right circle 296 
appeared first. Similar to the training phase, they were asked to make fast and accurate responses 297 
and were given the opportunity to take a break between each block. 298 
 Similar to the test phase of Experiment 1, participants were provided with 10 practice 299 
trials where the task was identical to the actual experiment with the exception that the stimulus 300 
circles were white. In total, there were 384 trials that were divided into 8 blocks. Two circles 301 
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resembling the Landolt C’s from the training phase, but with no gap (with a radius of 1.5°) were 302 
presented 6.4° away from the fixation cross, on the horizontal meridian. The two circles were 303 
drawn in the colors used in the training phase. Two types of trials were used; the high-value 304 
color appearing with a distractor color, and the low-value appearing with a distractor color. The 305 
first circle appeared on the left or right side of the fixation cross and was followed by the second 306 
circle that appeared following a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 64 ms, 32ms, or 16 ms. The 307 
two circles remained on the screen for 100 ms, after which they offset and a response was 308 
collected. 309 
Results and Discussion 310 
 Three of the 31 participants were excluded from the TOJ analysis because their response 311 
accuracy was not significantly above chance across all reward colors and SOAs (in other words, 312 
they did not temporally discriminate the two stimuli). All analyses were performed on the 313 
remaining 28 participants. Average correct response time during the training phase were again 314 
analysed using a Block X Reward ANOVA. Unlike Experiment 1, the learning phase of 315 
Experiment 2 revealed a marginal main effect of Value, F(1, 27) = 4.31, p = .05, ηp2 = 0.14, such 316 
that High Value targets were reported faster, M = 549ms, SE = 14ms, than Low Value targets, M 317 
= 560ms, SE = 15ms, as well as a main effect of Block, F(1, 27) = 37.54, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.58. 318 
 For the TOJ task, trials were organized by two factors: the SOA between Valued and 319 
Non-Valued color stimuli (six levels: -64 ms, -32 ms, -17 ms, 17 ms, 32 ms, 64 ms), and which 320 
Valued Color was used (Low Value, High Value). The responses on these trials were used to fit 321 
two Psychometric functions (cumulative Gaussian distributions) for each participant, 322 
parametrizing the probability of choosing the color with learned value as having appeared first at 323 
each SOA separately for the two valued colors. Fitting was accomplished using a maximum 324 
likelihood approach, with Matlab’s (by MathWorks) fminsearch function used to minimize the 325 
negative Log-Likelihood of the parameters of the Psychometric function. As a result, prior entry 326 
could be assessed for each Valued Color by comparing the point of subjective equality (PSE) 327 
defined by the Psychometric function (the point at which each stimulus is equally likely to be 328 
chosen, corresponding the μ, or mean, parameter of the function).  329 
 The PSS for the Low Value color, M = -3.78 ms, SE = 3 ms, was not significantly 330 
different from 0, t(27) = 1.30, p = .21, indicating no prior entry for the Low Value color, 331 
compared to a neutral color. Importantly, the PSS for the High Value color, M = -11ms, SE = 4 332 
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ms, was significantly different from 0, t(24) = 2.88, p = .007, indicating that High Value colors 333 
did receive prior entry (see Figure 3). A direct comparison of PSS values (Figure 3) yielded the 334 
same conclusion, t(27) = 2.08, p = .047, while no differences in the slope of temporal order 335 
judgments was evident, t(27) = 1.07, p = .29. These prior entry results suggest that learned value 336 
is able to affect pre-attentive visual priority. 337 
 338 
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 2’s test phase. The left panel depicts across-participant 339 
average probabilities of reporting the valued stimulus as onsetting first for each stimulus onset 340 
asynchrony. The right panel depicts averaged PSS values derived from individual participant fits. 341 
Error bars reflect one standard deviation of the mean. 342 
 343 
Experiment 3 344 
 Although Experiment 2 provided evidence that learned value leads to prior entry, the 345 
results are equally consistent with the possibility that learned value increases the choice salience 346 
of an object. A number of investigators have remarked that an increase in the probability of an 347 
object being chosen first in a temporal order judgment can be observed because of a true change 348 
in perceived temporal order, or simply a bias to choose a particular object for report (Shore, 349 
Spence, & Klein, 2001; Schneider & Bavelier, 2003). As such we ran a new group of participants 350 
through a task identical to the one we used in Experiment 2, save for the fact that participants 351 
were instructed to report the object that onset last. If the results of Experiment 2 were due to a 352 
bias towards choosing the rewarded stimulus, then we should observe a reversed effect on the 353 
PSS of stimuli with learned value. However, if the results of Experiment 2 were due to 354 
perceptual prior entry, then no such reversal should occur. 355 
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Participants 356 
 Thirty one adult volunteers were recruited for Experiment 3. Each participant was 357 
compensated with either course credit or $10 for participation. All participants provided 358 
informed consent, and no participants had participated in either Experiment 1 or 2. All 359 
experimental procedures were approved by University of Toronto’s Office of Research Ethics 360 
and in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 361 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 362 
 All apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 2. 363 
Participants were simply instructed that, during the temporal order judgment task, they should 364 
report which of the two stimuli onset last. 365 
Results and Discussion 366 
 Four participants were excluded, as in Experiment 2, on the basis of poor TOJ 367 
performance. Correct mean response times for the training phase were analysed in a Block X 368 
Value ANOVA. No main effect of Value was observed, F(1, 26) = 1.54, p = .23, ηp2 = 0.06, but 369 
RT was affected by Block, F(1, 26) = 14.82, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.36, such that RT was lower in the 370 
second half. A marginal Value X Block interaction was present, F(1, 26) = 3.57, p = .07, ηp2 = 371 
0.12, and so we analysed the effect of Value for the first and last halves of the training phase 372 
separately. In the first half, RT did not differ for High- and Low-reward targets, t(26) = 0.23, p = 373 
.82, but did differ for the second half, t(26) = 2.49, p = .02, suggesting that an RT benefit for 374 
High Value targets emerged later into the training phase.  375 
 PSS values for High- and Low-value stimuli were estimated again by fitting a cumulative 376 
Gaussian distribution, except that now the fitted distribution was inverted (i.e., 1 – φ). Unlike 377 
Experiment 1, neither Low-value stimuli, t(26) = 1.35, p = .19, nor High-value stimuli, t(26) = 378 
0.03, p = .97, showed a PSS shift from 0 (see Figure 4). Following the analysis of TOJ effects by 379 
Shore et al., (2001), this indicates that the responses in Experiment 2 were likely due to a mixture 380 
of prior entry and decision biases.  In the present experiment, the which-came-second task pitted 381 
these two effect against each other, and they cancelled each other out.  Thus, these results 382 
support the conclusion that learned-value affects both perceptual and response biases in temporal 383 
order judgments.   384 
 385 
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 386 
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 3’s test phase. The left panel depicts across-participant 387 
average probabilities of reporting the valued stimulus as onsetting last for each stimulus onset 388 
asynchrony. The right panel depicts averaged PSS values derived from individual participant fits. 389 
Error bars reflect on standard deviation of the mean. 390 
 391 
Experiment 4 392 
 Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that learned value can affect the perception of temporal 393 
order. However, whether this reflects true prior entry or not is still unclear. As first argued by 394 
Schneider and Bavelier (2003), TOJ tasks may be contaminated by a third type of bias – a 395 
decision bias. The TOJ task requires the detection two signals and comparing their onsets. Given 396 
the presence of sensory noise, some evidence threshold is necessary for the detection of onsets. 397 
A bias to report a valued stimulus may therefore reflect either an increase in the signal strength 398 
(i.e., a true change in the stimulus onset signal) or a change in its decision threshold. In 399 
Experiment 4, we measured the perception of onset for stimuli with learned value using a SJ 400 
task, where participants report whether two stimuli appear at the same time or different times. If 401 
stimuli with learned value indeed receive accelerated visual processing, we should observe a 402 
shifted PSS using this SJ task.  403 
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Participants 404 
 Thirty-one participants were again recruited to participate in Experiment 4. All 405 
participants were compensated for their participation with $10. All experimental procedures were 406 
approved by University of Toronto’s Office of Research Ethics and in accordance with the 407 
Declaration of Helsinki. 408 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 409 
Identical apparatus, stimuli, and procedure from the previous experiments were used in 410 
Experiment 4 with two exceptions. First, because simultaneity was to-be-reported in this task, we 411 
introduced trials in the test phase wherein stimuli onset simultaneously, randomly intermixed. To 412 
accommodate these extra trials, we increased the number of trials in the test phase from 384 to 413 
448. In total, there were 28 trials of the six asynchronous onsets used in Experiments 2 and 3, 414 
and 56 trials with simultaneous onsets, per stimulus type (low value vs. neutral, high value vs. 415 
neutral). Second, instead of being instructed to report the stimulus that onset first, participants 416 
were instructed to report whether the stimuli appeared at the same or different times. The “z” key 417 
was used to indicate perceived simultaneous onset and the “/” key was used to indicate perceived 418 
asynchronous onset. 419 
Results and Discussion 420 
 Three participants were excluded from analysis due to poor performance in the SJ task. 421 
Data from the remaining 28 participants was analysed for both the training and test phases. In the 422 
training phase, RTs were faster in the second half than the first, F(1, 27) = 7.99, p = .009, ηp2 = 423 
0.23. A main effect of Value was present, F(1, 27) = 25.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.48, but Value and 424 
Block interacted, F(1, 27) = 4.47, p = .044, ηp2 = 0.14. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that, as in 425 
Experiment 3, no difference in RT was present between High- and Low-value trials in the first 426 
half of the training phase, t(27) = 1.01, p = .32, but RT was faster for High- than Low-value trials 427 
in the second half, t(27) = 3.54, p = .001.  428 
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 Simultaneity judgments were analysed by fitting responses to the difference between a 429 
cumulative Gaussian distribution and an inverse Gaussian distribution, as in Schneider and 430 
Bavelier (2003). Paired-samples t-tests showed no differences between the parameters fitted for 431 
High- and Low-value SJs, ts(27) < 0.44, ps > .66, and, critically, no difference between the PSS 432 
between High- and Low-value stimuli (see Figure 5), t(27) = 0.25, p = .80. These results 433 
challenge the conclusion that learned value leads to accelerated visual processing per se, and 434 
instead favor an account wherein perceptual decision thresholds are lowered for valued stimuli, 435 
leaving the speed of sensory processing unchanged. One potential explanation for why we found 436 
a PSS shift in our TOJ tasks, but not the SJ task, comes from van Eijk, Kohlrausch, Juolaand van 437 
de Par (2010), who showed that PSS estimates in TOJ tasks can reflect a shift towards the 438 
stimulus with greater temporal sensitivity. Fitting our data with asymmetric slopes (i.e., different 439 
mean and standard deviations for the Value-stimulus leading and Value-stimulus trailing 440 
components of the response distribution), however, did not yield slope differences, t(27)s < 1.57, 441 
ps > .13. As such, our data cannot speak to this possibility. 442 
 443 
Figure 5. Responses to High- and Low-value stimuli in the SJ task. The left panel depicts 444 
aggregate mean simultaneity reports for each SOA. The right panel depicts average, estimated 445 
PSS values. Error bars depict 1 within-subjects standard error. 446 
 447 
General Discussion 448 
 The present study sought to establish whether learned value can affect pre-attentive 449 
processing of previously rewarded visual information using a behavioral measurement. In 450 
Experiment 1, we replicated the findings of Anderson et al. (2011b), confirming that our training 451 
procedure was able to produce a value-driven attentional bias. In Experiment 2, we used an 452 
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identical training phase to imbue stimuli with differential learned value. Using a temporal order 453 
judgment task, we observed that stimuli with greater learned value were perceived to onset 454 
earlier than stimuli with lower learned value, but equivalent exposure and task-relevance history.  455 
Experiment 3 showed that these effects where not entirely due to simple response biases.  456 
Critically, however, Experiment 4 showed no such difference in perceived simultaneity between 457 
High- and Low-value stimuli. Schneider and Bavelier (2003) argued that such a pattern of results 458 
– a shifted PSS for attended stimuli in TOJ tasks, but not in SJ tasks - indicates that no sensory 459 
acceleration occurs due to attention, but rather the decision criteria used to estimate onset time 460 
are affected. Indeed, research has shown that PSS estimates in TOJ and SJ tasks do not 461 
necessarily correlate (van Eijk, Kohlrausch, Juola, & van de Par, 2008). One explanation for why 462 
this occurs is that biased PSS values in TOJ tasks occur due to a bias to report the stimulus that 463 
has better temporal resolution (van Eijk, Kohlrausch, Juola, & van de Par, 2010). However, we 464 
did not observe differences in sensitivity when value-laden stimuli onset first, compared to last, 465 
in our SJ task. It is important to note that SJ and TOJ tasks may reflect decisions based on 466 
different sensory information; specifically, SJ judgments may often be based on the total 467 
duration of both stimuli, if stimulus durations are fixed (see Love, Petrini, Cheng, & Pollick, 468 
2013). Therefore, the inference that no prior entry occurs for stimuli with learned value from our 469 
data requires the supposition that a lack of a PSS shift in SJ tasks accompanied by shifted PSS 470 
values in TOJ tasks should be interpreted as a post-perceptual decision bias, consistent with the 471 
dominant view in the prior entry literature (see Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; García-Pérez & 472 
Alcalá-Quintana, 2015). As such, we conclude that learned value acquired in our task did not 473 
produce prior entry. 474 
 Several studies measuring the effects of recently delivered rewards on selective attention 475 
show what may be considered to be early effects of reward on selection (Hickey, Chelazzi, & 476 
Theeuwes, 2010; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2011). In particular, priming of pop-out is 477 
enhanced after reward delivery (Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009), and visual priming similarly leads 478 
to shifts in the PSS for as measured by both TOJ and SJ tasks (Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 479 
2013). Given the lack of a clear PSS shift across tasks, despite consistent stimulus value learning, 480 
we suggest that the consequences of recent reward and learned value for visual processing may 481 
in fact differ. As such, future research should compare the effects of recently delivered reward 482 
and learned value with caution; although the distracting effect of stimuli associated with reward 483 
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over the short- and long-term in search may be similar, the broader visual effects of reward and 484 
value may not be identical. While detailed descriptions of how moment-to-moment rewards may 485 
result in lasting attentional biases have been advanced (Rombouts, Bohte, Martinez-Trujillo, & 486 
Roelfsema, 2015; Failing & Theeuwes, 2016), our results suggest that this process is worth 487 
investigating in detail. As noted earlier, Kristjánsson et al. (2010) found that the effect of reward 488 
on priming of pop-out rapidly changes when reward contingencies change, leaving open the 489 
possibility that the removing reward contingencies (as is necessarily done in studies of learned 490 
value) may affect early sensory consequences of reward more than later consequences (i.e., 491 
response and decisions biases).  This is, however, inconsistent with the ERP findings of Maclean 492 
and Giesbrecht (2015).  493 
The issue of how stimulus-reward pairings do or do not accumulate in to lasting value-494 
driven biases may benefit from an integration with the rich literature on the mechanisms of 495 
intertrial priming of attention (Becker, 2008; Olivers & Meeters, 2006; Kristjánsson & Campana, 496 
2010; Kruijne & Meeter, 2016). Indeed, Sha & Jiang (2106) have recently argued that value-497 
driven attention may rely on target history-related priming. While our results showed value-498 
dependent differences in capture -- that is, high-value stimuli were found and reported as 499 
onsetting faster than low-value stimuli -- both stimuli had a history of task-relevance, raising the 500 
possibility that stimulus value is learned for attended stimuli only (but see Le Pelley, Pearson, 501 
Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). If the developing literature on learned value and attention seeks to 502 
account for real-world attentional biases (e.g., Field & Cox, 2008), then characterizing the 503 
mechanisms underlying the learning of stimulus value will be of critical importance.   504 
One potentially significant difference between our experiments and those experiments 505 
that show an early effect of learned value is that we used a money-less reward-learning task. The 506 
majority of value-driven attention studies rely on monetary incentive in order to create stimuli 507 
with value associations. Three exceptions are Shomstein and Johnson (2013), who showed a 508 
reversal of object-based attention when more points were awarded for the correct detection of 509 
targets in non-cued objects, regardless of whether the points led to monetary reward or simply 510 
were accumulated, Miranda and Palmer (2014), who showed that combining points and sound 511 
effects (as well as a “high-score” counter) could produce similar learned-value effects for stimuli 512 
paired with higher reward, and Roper and Vecera (2016), who paired correct responses to 513 
different target stimuli with the presentation of different denominations of currency, finding that 514 
LEARNED VALUE PRIOR ENTRY 20 
those stimuli paired with the appearance of larger denominations led to greater attentional 515 
capture. While it appears that monetary reward is not necessary to entrain learned value when 516 
measured using search times, it is possible that not all rewards affect perception equally, or that 517 
the longevity of different rewards’ effects on attention differ. Indeed, Miranda and Palmer did 518 
not find that points alone could create value-driven attention effects, whereas points alone were 519 
sufficient to affect attention in both Shomstein and Johnson’s experiments and our experiments. 520 
While differences exist in each case between the specific tasks and point values used, we note 521 
that, in our task, higher points reduced the number of trials that participants needed to complete, 522 
as each block of trials simply required a criterion value of accumulated points in order to be 523 
completed. In our paradigm, then, learned value may have been predicated on the reduction in 524 
time or effort that accompanied higher point-values. As the old adage goes, time is money, and 525 
the subjective impact of a high-reward in our task translates to a reduction in the potential 526 
number of trials to be completed. While participants were clearly sensitive to this reward, it may 527 
not bias attention in quite the same way as the receipt of money. One reason for this could be that 528 
the delivery of money (even symbolic) would be considered positive reinforcement, whereas 529 
earning points that reduce the number of trials to be completed could arguably be considered 530 
negative reinforcement (the removal of impending effort). As such, these types of rewards may 531 
produce different effects on selection.  532 
Another salient difference between Miranda and Palmer’s experiments, which showed no 533 
effect of points alone on attention, and experiments where non-monetary reward led to value-534 
driven attention (Shomstein & Johnson, 2013; Roper & Vecera, 2016; the present experiments) 535 
is the difference in feedback complexity. Experiments where non-monetary reward has led to 536 
value-driven attention have used consistent mappings between a particular feedback stimulus and 537 
high- or low-rewards. In our experiment, high rewards were always “200 points” and low 538 
rewards were always “20 points”; in Shomstein and Johnson’s experiments, high rewards were 539 
always “6 points” and low rewards were always “1 point”; in Roper and Vecera’s experiments’, 540 
high rewards were always depictions of $20 and low rewards were always depictions of $5. 541 
Indeed, Miranda and Palmer’s successful demonstrations of non-monetary, value-driven 542 
attention (Experiments 1 and 3) seem to have occurred when a particular sound (an “electric 543 
whip”) accompanied positive feedback; points, when awarded, varied by participants’ response 544 
time, meaning that the high reward values, while 5 times larger than the low reward values on 545 
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average, could change across trials, perhaps making reward-stimulus associations more difficult 546 
to learn. This is not to say that consistent mapping is sufficient for reward learning, as Roper and 547 
Vecera found no value-driven attentional biases when monetary amounts did not appear as 548 
monetary images, but instead as simple numeric amounts (even when preceded by a dollar-sign). 549 
However, a consistent mapping between high-value and particular stimulus that conveys high 550 
value may be important for the rapid formation of value-driven attentional biases. If this is the 551 
case, it suggests that associations between value and attention may be underlain by associations 552 
between stimuli (i.e., between target stimuli and the stimuli that signal reward, but not between 553 
target stimuli and abstract reward). While the use of a different types of reward may be 554 
responsible for conflicting results, insofar as our lack of prior entry conflicts with ERP data, 555 
ultimately, we see this as an advantage for the literature on reward, value, and attention. One 556 
goal of research into the effects of reward and value on attention must be generalizable theories, 557 
and so testing different types of rewards (e.g., positive emotional expressions; Anderson, 2015) 558 
is essential to understanding the nuances of motivated attention. 559 
  560 
   561 
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